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Law, Cognition, and Identity
Eric J. Mitnick*
I. UNDERSTANDING LAW AND SOCIAL IDENTITY: THE NEED FOR A

SOCIAL COGNITIVE TURN

There is a growing literature within sociolegal research
regarding the constitutive nature of law.' This literature primarily
has been concerned with demonstrating that legal institutions
constitute aspects of social life, including, at times, aspects of
human social identity. 2 The constitutive influence of law becomes
most obvious when the legal system under scrutiny exhibits an
overtly differentiated form of citizenship, such as in ancient3
Athens, feudal Europe, or even the pre-Civil War United States.
In these societies, law served to embed multiple privileged and
subordinate social and political statuses, differentiated according to
Copyright 2007, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
Associate Professor, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. Ph.D. (Politics),
Princeton University (2004); J.D., University of Michigan (1991); A.B., Cornell
University (1988).
1. Applications and interpretations of constitutive theory in law have
arisen across a substantial variety of disciplines, including the law and society
movement, see, e.g., Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, EditorialIntroduction,
in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE 1-20 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1993);
the critical legal studies and critical race theory movements, see, e.g., Ian Haney
Lopez, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996), and Robert
W. Gordon, CriticalLegal Histories,36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984); the discipline
of political science, see, e.g., Rogers M. Smith, Political Jurisprudence, The
New Institutionalism, and the Future of Public Law, 82 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 89
(1988); Michael W. McCann, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE
POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994); and within analytic jurisprudence,
see, e.g., Neil MacCormick & Ota Weinberger, AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF
LAW: NEW APPROACHES TO LEGAL POSITIVISM (Ruth Adler & Neil
MacCormick trans., 1986). For a general treatment of constitutive theory, see
Alan Hunt, EXPLORATIONS IN LAW AND SOCIETY: TOWARD A CONSTITUTIVE
THEORY OF LAW (1993).
2. For recent illustrations, see, e.g., David M. Engel & Frank W. Munger,
RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND IDENTITY N THE LIFE STORIES OF AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES (2003); Rogers M. Smith, STORIES OF PEOPLEHOOD: THE
POLITICS AND MORALS OF POLITICAL MEMBERSHIP (2003); Efren Rivera Ramos,
THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY: THE JUDICIAL AND SOCIAL LEGACY OF
AMERICAN COLONIALISM IN PUERTO RICO (2001).
3. See, e.g., Virginia Hunter, Introduction:Status Distinctions in Athenian
Law, in LAW AND SOCIAL STATUS INCLASSICAL ATHENS 1-29 (Virginia Hunter
& Jonathan Edmondson eds., 2000); Rogers M. Smith, CIVIC IDEALS:
CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP N U.S. HISTORY (1997); Gordon, supra
note 1, at 103.
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characteristics such as lineage, caste, and race. As a result, one's
status as citizen, serf, or slave served not only as a social but also
as a legal position, grounded not merely in social relations but also
entrenched in, and reinforced by, the law itself.
As enlightening as constitutive treatments of ancient, medieval,
and slave legal systems have been, however, the more interesting,
surprising, and indeed potentially disquieting finding within the
recent sociolegal literature on constitutive theory is the virtual
ubiquity of law's constitutive influence in contemporary liberal
democratic societies. For while consideration of pre-liberal society
may throw the constitutive character of law more dramatically into
relief, modem liberal democratic legal institutions persist
unreservedly in structuring the categories through which
individuals perceive social life and status. "Most social relations,"
Austin Sarat and Jonathan Simon have written, "are permeated
with law. Long before we ever think about going to a courtroom,
we encounter landlords and tenants, husbands and wives, barkeeps
and hotel guests--roles that already embed a variety of juridical
notions. ' 4 The law defines social roles such as these, signifying
how we should be interpreted and how we should interpret others.
Consider the following social labels: one person might be
described as "disabled," another mentioned as a "citizen," and a
third as a member of a particular cultural group, such as a "Native
American." Or, of course, each of these social labels might apply
to a single individual, representing several different aspects of his
social identity. The point here is that each of these identity types is
constituted in virtue of the operation of a number of social
institutions, including, in significant part, law.
Hence, the constitutive nature of law might be embodied in a
legislative right defining and granting a right against
discrimination to a certain category of persons differentiated on the
basis of disability.5 Or law's constitutive influence might emanate,
as it does with citizenship, from an actual constitution and related
statutes describing the types of individuals granted full political
membership, along with the rights and obligations of that social,
political, and legal status.6 Consider too the sense in which U.S.
legal institutions have conceptualized and categorized Native
Americans: in the legislative arena, there is even a distinct volume
4. Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, Beyond Legal Realism? Cultural
Analysis, CulturalStudies, and the Situation ofLegal Scholarship, 13 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 3, 20 (2001).
5. See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-13 (2000);
Engel & Munger, supra note 2.
6. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 3, at 31.
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of the U.S. Code concerning federal Indian law; judicial decisions
regarding particular tribes and their members typically serve as
general precedents for all other Native American tribes and
individuals; there is within the U.S. government an administrative
agency, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, delegated by Congress
general responsibility for regulating state interaction with Native
American tribes; and, even within the U.S. Constitution, Native
Americans are accorded a distinct and, with respect to other tribes,
undifferentiated status.7 And yet, each of the tribes labeled and
treated in this essentially uniform fashion exists (or, at least,
existed) as a distinct indigenous national group, differentiated from
other native groups geographically, culturally, linguistically, and in
terms of social and political organization. The notion of the Native
American as a type of person, or as an aspect of one's social
identity, is the product of the historical fact of two large,
heterogeneous, and previously removed populations, the European
and the North American, converging, and the social, including
legal, classifications that resulted from those encounters.8 The
Native American social status and identity, along with that of the
disabled and the citizenry, and indeed any number of other social
identity types, is, in part, an effect of law.
As early as 1981 and as part of his Storrs Lectures at Yale Law
School, Clifford Geertz had already indicated the importance of
adopting a constitutive perspective toward law. "[L]aw," Geertz
said, "rather than a mere technical add-on to a morally (or
immorally) finished society, is . . . an active part of it ... [1]aw,
even so technocratized a variety as our own, is, in a word'
constructive; in another, constitutive; in a third, formational."
From Geertz's perspective, the then predominant, essentially
descriptive conception of culture as a relatively static inventory of
norms and traditions was insufficiently complex, insufficiently
interactive. Geertz and those who came after taught that culture,
including legal institutions, should be conceptualized as a far more
dynamic social phenomenon, continuously forming and being
formed by human thought and social behavior.10 Hence, just as it
7. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (taxation); Joane Nagel,
AMERICAN INDIAN ETHNIC RENEWAL: RED POWER AND THE RESURGENCE OF
IDENTITY AND CULTURE

3 (1996).

8. See, e.g., Nagel, supra note 7, at 3.
9. Clifford Geertz, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE:
INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY

FURTHER

ESSAYS

IN

218 (1983).

10. See, e.g., Nagel, supra note 7, at 44 ("That culture provides a blueprint
for action is only one side of the culture-agency coin stamped by symbolic
conceptions of culture; the other side of that coin depicts human action as
forging culture itself.").
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is, at some level, human agency that sanctions and constructs
legally differentiated treatment of citizens and aliens, the ablebodied and the disabled, and Native and other Americans, the legal
institution of such differentiated cultural positions in turn
reinforces and further constructs the social identities of the
individuals so described. According to this view, colorfully
described by Naomi Mezey as "the dance of mutual
constructedness," legal institutions play a vital role in shaping
individuals and communities, and individuals and communities in
turn shape the law. 1 We may in truth determine the content of our
law, but our law will also play a significant role in determining
who and what we are.
Even more ominously, because we so readily internalize
legally constructed categories, values, and definitions, we are
rarely specifically conscious of their influence on our
perceptions.12 In this sense, constitutive theory is related to the
critical legal studies movement, though arguably more as sibling
than as descendant.1 3 The most fundamental commonality in the
two traditions, owing to their common derivation from legal
realism more generally, is their rejection of a purely internal
approach to conceptualizing law. In the wake of realism's
challenge to legal formalism, critical legal scholars argued that the
allegedly authoritative principles said to underlie law are not only
practically but also necessarily internally inconsistent and that
legal decisions are, therefore, inevitably exercises in political
power.' 4 Yet, where critical legal studies grew out of realism's
rejection of legal objectivity, constitutive theory developed from
the felt need of sociolegal scholars to further conceptualize law's
role within social life. 15 And while critical legal studies was nearly
everywhere criticized for its incessant tendency toward abstraction,
constitutive theory is nearly always introduced within a particular
social context.
11. Naomi Mezey, Out of the Ordinary: Law, Power, Culture, and the
Commonplace, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 145, 152 (2001).
12. See Paul Schiff Berman, The Cultural Life of Capital Punishment:
Surveying the Benefits of a CulturalAnalysis of Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1129,
1171 (2002) (remarking on the "subtle ways in which law operates to construct
our understanding of the world and what we take to be the 'natural' order of
things").
13. On the critical legal studies movement, see generally Mark Kelman, A
GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987).
14. See, e.g., THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE

(David
Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, THE CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986).
15. See Hunt, supra note 1, at 304.
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Yet, while the constitutive approach to understanding the
relationship between law and social identity has been applied now
in a substantial variety of contexts, from disability to indigenous
cultural groups to citizenship, race, and colonialism, and so on,
there remains within sociolegal scholarship only the most limited
sense of how, why, and to what extent legal institutions actually
constitute aspects of our social identities.' 6 In large part, this gulf
in the literature seems to be the result of the apparent boundaries of
the respective disciplines within which these theories typically are
developed and articulated.
Whereas the influence of legal
institutions on social identity has been almost exclusively the
province of sociolegal studies, the nature of human social identity
and the social cognitive processes that give rise to social identity
have been studied most extensively from within the fields of
cultural sociology and social and cognitive psychology. In order to
more fully discern the social cognitive mechanisms that enable
legal institutions to constitute aspects of our social identities, then,
this article suggests the need for a turn toward these other
disciplines.
As social psychologist Karmela Liebkind has
suggested:
The nature of the reality we are trying to understand is not
dependent on the ad hoc division of academic disciplines...
if the domain of ethnic identity is ever to become
illuminated by the joint efforts of different social and
behavioural sciences, some amount of theoretical and
empirical coordination and cooperation is imperative, thus
cutting across the territorial chauvinism of the various
disciplines participating in this venture.
Social
psychologists definitely need to know, not only what
sociology and psychology, but also what anthropology,
philosophy, and political science have to say about ethnic
identity. 17

The reverse obviously is true as well. Sociolegal scholars
stand to gain from learning what social and cognitive psychology
have to say about identity, and, given the rate at which we in the
legal academy have become interested in pursuing the influence of
legal institutions on social identity, perhaps even more so. If we
16. See, e.g., Engel & Munger, supra note 2 (disability); Lopez, supra note

1 (race); Nagel, supra note 7 (cultural groups); Ramos, supra note 2
(colonialism); Smith, supra note 3 (citizenship).
17. Karmela Liebkind, Ethnic Identity-Challenging the Boundaries of
Social Psychology, in

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF IDENTITY AND THE SELF

CONCEPT 147, 179 (Glynis M. Breakwell ed., 1992) (citation omitted).
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are ever to truly understand the relationship between law and social
identity, the disciplinary walls need to come down.
Previously, I have contended that legal institutions participate
in the construction of social identity types through processes of
18
categorization that are intrinsic to the operation of a legal system.
Legal rules, in virtue of their generality, necessarily categorize
persons, and when the investitive criteria that serve as the bases for
legal categorization reflect socially salient characteristics, aspects
of human social identity are reinforced and often further
constructed.' 9 Clearly, however, not every legal rule will influence
social identity in a meaningful way-not every legal categorization
will turn on socially salient criteria. Why, then, are some laws
constitutive of social identity, while others are not? What is it that
makes certain legally investitive criteria, such as disability,
citizenship, and one's status as a Native American, socially salient,
while so many other legal statuses are constitutively
inconsequential?
Further, law is surely not the only social
institution constitutive of identity. How does law correspond with
other agents of socialization, such as schools, the family, and the
media, that serve further to constitute collective social identity
types? Even more fundamentally, what is the essential nature of a
social category, and how does that nature relate to the categories
constructed by legal institutions? And why should law categorize
persons?
Is it because of the oft-repeated virtues of legal
generality and formal justice (e.g., fairness, equality,
predictability), or might legal categorization, along with its virtues,
be at least partially an effect of deeper cognitive processes?
This article represents a preliminary attempt to answer these
and related questions, and thereby to comprehend on a deeper level
the interactive constitutive relationship between law and social
identity. Legal institutions, sociolegal research has shown, play a
role in the constitution of social identities. But social identity itself
is the consequence of a complex arrangement of sociological,
social, and cognitive psychological phenomena. Hence, a deeper
and more complete understanding of law's constitutive influence
requires bridging advances in sociolegal studies to research in
these related fields. To that end, Part II, just below, relates the
processes of legal categorization to human cognitive categorization
of the social world, suggesting that the categorization of persons
that results from law should be associated with, and indeed be
18. See Eric J. Mitnick, Constitutive Rights, 20 O.J.L.S. 185, 193-200

(2000).

19. See Eric J. Mitnick, Three Models of Group-DifferentiatedRights, 35

COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 215, 220-22 (2004).
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conceptualized as partially derivative of, social cognitive
categorization. Part III then considers the essential nature of social
categories, drawing an analogy between, on one hand, traditional
and contemporary conceptions of such categories within cognitive
psychology and, on the other, the doctrines of legal formalism and
realism. Part IV takes up the question of the nature of social
identity and asks why it is that legal institutions constitute the
particular collective identity types that they do constitute, turning
for a preliminary answer to treatments of the function of social
salience within social and cognitive psychology. Part V explores
the processes of legal and other social labeling that result in the
construction of collective identity types, describing in particular
law's role in that process as an agent of socialization. In
conclusion, the article locates law within an array of other socially
constitutive institutions and it points the way toward further
interdisciplinary research regarding the role of legal institutions in
the constitution of social identity. For, in virtue of the recent
efforts of sociolegal scholars, we now know that law is not only an
aspect but also an engine of culture. Understanding the inner
workings of that engine, however, will require a sustained turn
toward the theory of social cognition.
II. LEGAL CATEGORIZATION AND SOCIAL COGNITION

Rawls tells us that the concept of justice concerns the proper
2
distribution of benefits and obligations across persons in society. 0
The concept of justice provides us with a formula, the formula of
formal justice, the purpose of which is to arrive at an appropriate
balance among competing claims: like cases are to be treated alike,
and different cases are to be treated differently. The doctrine of
formal justice is expressed in law in virtue of law's generality, or
law's rule-oriented nature. 21 As Rawls says, "Formal justice ...
becomes the rule of law when applied to the legal system."' 22 In
the legislative context, this generality is normally apparent from
the outset, as a legislative rule will vest rights or impose
obligations upon a class of persons by describing in advance the
characteristics that compose the class. Though the class described
by the legislative rule will rarely be universal, it must always be
universalizable; that is, while formal justice does not mandate that
every person be accorded precisely the same legal rights and
duties, it does require that all persons under relevantly similar
20. See John Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 5-10 (rev. ed. 1971).
21.
22.

See Lon L. Fuller, THE MORALITY OF LAW 46-49 (1964).
Rawls, supra note 20, at 235.
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conditions be accorded the same rights and duties. 23 The
generality of adjudication, on the other hand, may only appear with
time as a series of individual cases between particular parties are
decided and as a rule of law evolves into being. Yet, both
legislation, in its more immediate sense, and adjudication, over
time, are designed to treat similar cases similarly.
Notice, then, that one fundamental consequence of the rule of
law will be the categorization of persons within a given legal
system. Examples abound, of course, insofar as legal rules are
endemic and categorization is intrinsic to law. In the legislative
context, consider the class of individuals over forty years of age,
each member of which holds a right in our legal system to be free
of discrimination in employment decisions on the basis of their
age; 24 or the class of persons with a physical or mental impairment

that substantially limits a major life activity, each of whom is
invested by statute with a right against similar forms of
discrimination on the basis of disability; or members of various
trades and professions, such as doctors and electricians, each of
whom may be obligated bv state law to fulfill certification and
other similar requirements. 6 Each of these legislative rights and
obligations vest in individuals, and yet their legislative generality
entails the classification of persons according to legally investitive
criteria.27
Within adjudication as well, the categorization of persons is
inherent, though, as mentioned above, it may become apparent
only sequentially. Whether interpreting legislative provisions or
founding common law rights and duties, formal justice requires
that adjudicative bodies reason analogically and thereby afford
similar subsequent cases like treatment.
Hence, if a court
determines that procreation is a major life activity such that a
person incapable of giving birth should be considered disabled for
statutory purposes, the court may not later deny that same legal
status to other claimants deemed similarly incapable. Or, if a court
imposes a duty in common law tort on psychotherapists to warn
potential victims of their patients, the court may not, consistent
23. See Fuller, supra note 21, at 47 ("[T]he desideratum of generality is
sometimes interpreted to mean that the law must act impersonally, that its rules
must apply to general classes and should contain no proper names.").
24. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2000).
25. See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-13 (2000).
26. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3099.2 (West 2003) (certification of
electricians).
27. For an extended discussion of the relationship between formal justice
and legal categorization, see Eric J. Mitnick, Taking Rights Spherically: Formal
and Collective Aspects ofLegal Rights, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 409 (1999).
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with formal justice, later absolve a particular psychotherapist of
that obligation, at least without a basis for that differentiation that
then should initiate a new rule and a new prospective
classification.
Legal rules, then, in light of formal justice, categorize persons.
But why should they do this? The precept of formal justice, along
with the doctrine of legal generality, is commonly justified with
reference to principles of impartiality, formal equality, and
freedom. 2 8 And, in truth, it is not difficult to see that the precept
does exclude certain forms of procedural injustice.
Within
legislation, generality ensures that no individual is legislatively
singled out either for pain or benefit and so endeavors to treat
persons impartially and as equals. In its adjudicative aspect, law's
generality strives to place the burden of decision on the rule rather
than on the arbiter and so promotes fairness and individual
freedom by constraining official discretion and oppression.
Further, to the extent that legal rules are laid down in advance and
made known, individuals and organizations may better organize
their lives and enterprises and, in that sense too, liberty may be
increased.29 Of course, formal justice remains merely an ideal or a
morality of aspiration. 30
Indeed, more ink has been spilled
disproving the reality of legal formalism than ever was used in its

name. 31 Moreover, even when functioning, the precept provides

no assurance of substantive justice since its application will, of
course, turn on what a legal system takes to be relevant similarities
and differences among persons. 32 Still, "we can say," together
28. See, e.g., John Finnis, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 273 (1980)
("The fundamental point of [the rule of law] is to secure to the subjects of
authority the dignity of self-direction and freedom from certain forms of
manipulation. The Rule of Law is thus among the requirements of justice or
fairness."); Gerald F. Gaus, JUSTIFICATORY LIBERALISM: AN ESSAY ON
EPISTEMOLOGY AND POLITICAL THEORY 199 (1996) ("Citizens are to be treated
equally unless relevant grounds can be demonstrated for unequal treatment.");
Friedrich A. Hayek, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 153 (1960) ("The
conception of freedom under the law ... rests on the contention that when we
obey laws, in the sense of general abstract rules laid down irrespective of their
application to us, we are not subject to another man's will and are therefore
free.").
29. See Rawls, supra note 20, at 239 ("[When] the boundaries of our liberty
are uncertain... liberty is restricted by a reasonable fear of its exercise.").
30. See Fuller, supra note 21, at 170.
31. The reference here is to the well-known critiques of legal formalism
within legal scholarship, including those variously on offer in the schools of
legal realism, critical legal studies, and critical race theory.
32. See, e.g., Neil MacCormick, Natural Law and the Separation of Law
and Morals, in NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 105, 122

(Robert P. George ed., 1992) ("[L]egal generality can in principle be as well
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with Rawls, "that, other things equal, one legal order is more justly
another if it more perfectly fulfills the precepts
administered than 33
of the rule of law."
Hence, even if we are uncertain about human manipulation of
law's generality or about the doctrine's lack of substantive content,
we can grasp the reality of legal categorization and comprehend
the moral attraction of formal justice. The virtues of fairness,
freedom, and equality, advanced by formal justice, are central to
any meaningfully liberal legal system. But, again, is this why we
categorize? To begin to think further about this question, let me
introduce a brief story from my own life. One Sunday afternoon
on a visit to Central Park in New York City, I walked with my then
twenty-month-old son along a path near a reservoir. At one point,
my son dropped a piece of a large pretzel I had purchased for him
on the ground, and almost immediately a small group of pigeons
gathered, attempting to tear the piece of pretzel apart. My son
pointed at the pigeons, turned to me, and proudly said, "duckie." I
laughed and then corrected my son. "Pigeon," I said, "those are
pigeons." For the rest of the day, whenever we saw a group of
pigeons walking about, my son would point at the group and say,
"pin." At that moment, for him at least, the category of virtually
all winged creatures that were in the habit of walking around parks
taking food from humans had just been expanded from one to two
types. There were "duckies," and there were "pin."
My son's early experience of birds is, of course, a perfectly
ordinary example of the sort of human childhood development that
occurs everywhere, everyday. And that is precisely the point. We
naturally think in terms of categories-not only children as they
are developing, but all human beings as we experience the social
world. Simply look out a window and try to avoid the process of
categorization. I suspect you will find it nearly impossible. We
inherently categorize nearly everything we perceive, from cars to
trees to buildings to people. In his seminal work on The Nature of
Prejudice,Gordon Allport had cause to consider this process:
A million events befall us every day. We cannot handle so
many events. If we think of them at all, we type them.
Open-mindedness is considered to be a virtue. But, strictly
speaking, it cannot occur. A new experience must be

observed by those whose laws wreak great substantive injustice as by those
whose laws are in substance as just as can possibly be.").
33. Rawls, supra note 20, at 236.
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redacted into old categories.
We cannot handle each event
34
freshly in its own right.
Today, many of the same insights that animated Allport's study
are stimulating research advancements within the branches of
sociology and social and cognitive psychology concerned with
social cognition. 35 As described by social psychologist Judith
Howard:
Social cognition is a theory of how we store and process
information.
Social cognition has close roots to
psychology and a reliance on experimental laboratory
methodologies. Several central assumptions underlie social
cognitive theories of identity: that human cognitive
capacities are limited; that, therefore, we process
information as cognitive misers, streamlining information
to manage the demands of everyday interaction; that,
following from this need for cognitive efficiency, we
categorize information about people, objects, and situations
before we engage memory or inferential processes.36
As Allport suggested several decades ago, and as cognitive
psychologists continue to demonstrate experimentally today, social
stimuli would overwhelm the human brain were it not for our
inherent tendency to categorize our perceptions of the world and
draw inferences from the classes that result. Our cognitive
categories are thought to be maintained mentally as abstract
structures, or "schemas." 37 Such cognitive schemas are composed
of generalized characteristics, such as traits or behaviors,
descriptive of the constituents of any given cognitive category. As
human beings encounter the social world, our perceptions are
filtered through these mechanisms of social cognition, these
cognitive categories and schemas, that we all reflexively develop.
In this way, then, our cognitive categories and associated schemas
dramatically influence the ways in which we interpret, process, and
use social and self information and they do so largely on a
subconscious level. As an example, consider the social category of
doctors. We all have a somewhat different schema, or a series of
34. Gordon W. Allport, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 20 (25th anniv. ed.
1979).
35. See Gordon B. Moskowitz, SOCIAL COGNITION: UNDERSTANDING SELF
AND OTHERS vii (2005).
36. Judith A. Howard, Social Psychology of Identities, 26 ANN. REV. Soc.
367, 368 (2000).
37. On cognitive schemas generally, see Moskowitz, supra note 35, at
155-63.
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overlapping schemas, associated with our cognitive category of
doctors. Upon encountering relevant doctor-related stimuli in the
world, our doctor schema enables our minds to summon a series of
traits and behaviors we associate with members of this social
cognitive category. The same holds true for innumerable other
cognitive categories. We all subconsciously maintain schemas for
our cognitive categories of academics, taxicab drivers, Catholics,
women, and so on. Schemas such as these serve, in conjunction
with the cognitive processes of categorization for which they
provide an organizational structure, as instinctive mental shortcuts,
enabling human beings to navigate our otherwise overwhelmingly
complex social and inner worlds.
Some theorists of social cognition have speculated, as does
Judith Howard above, that our reflexive mental processes that
serve to construct cognitive categories and associated schemas are
a reflection of adaptive cognitive efficiency. Yet, other cognitive
psychologists,
through experimentation,
seemingly have
demonstrated that we operate mentally according to the same
processes of categorization even in circumstances where stimuli
are limited and the resources for drawing fine distinctions
abound.38 This is the basis for the notion, presently foundational
within social cognition theory, that human beings are "cognitive
misers." Hence, it could be that by functioning mentally in virtue
of generalization and inference, we are simply economically
seeking to conserve our cognitive faculties, a trait that in turn
reflects an evolutionary adaptation maximizing the prospects for
human survival in a hostile world. On the other hand, social
cognitive experimentation seems to demonstrate "that people are
simply lazy . . . [r]esponding with minimal effort when it is
possible to act in a mindful, deliberate, and systematic fashion
would seem to be better characterized as acting in a fashion
that is
39
stingy and miserly in the use of their cognitive abilities."
Whether it is in virtue of efficiency or apathy, social cognition
theory shows that it simply is the case that our mental capacities,
including especially our working memory, are subject to critical
limitations in social perception. When this limited capacity is
combined with what Walter Lippmann referred to as "the great
blooming, buzzing confusion of the outer world,' 4° the result, as
we have seen, is an inherent tendency toward generalization, and
with it, categorization. Notice, then, the strong parallel between
social cognition theory and the functioning of formal justice.
38. See id. at 174-78.
39. Id. at 177.
40. Id. at 173 (quoting Walter Lippmann, PUBLIC OPINION 55 (1922)).
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Formal justice mandates the classification of persons according to
legally relevant characteristics. Social cognition theory provides
evidence that the classification of persons is in fact an innate
aspect of brain functioning. The legal-institutional parsing of
relevant similarities and differences among persons does indeed
serve the goals of fairness and predictability identified above, but
the cause of this process may, at least in part, lie deep within our
own cognitive makeup. Indeed, it might be fair to say that we "do"
formal justice--that we treat similarly situated people similarly
and differently situated people differently-not, at the most
fundamental level, because it is fair or just or conducive to
freedom or predictability but because that is simply how our brains
function. It might even be possible that we consider the process of
formal justice fair because we innately perceive the social world
through the lens of social categories.
III. THE NATURE OF SOCIAL CATEGORIES: Fuzzy SETS AND LEGAL
INDETERMINACY

Social cognition theory is important not merely because it aids
our understanding of why we categorize persons but also because it
reveals significantly how we categorize, or the mechanisms and
tendencies underlying the processes of social classification and
identification. Before we can begin to consider their construction,
however, we shall need first to gain a clearer understanding of the
nature of social categories. As defined by Gordon Moskowitz, "A
category is a grouping of similar objects/people in memory-a
grouping based on the important or essential features that define
the class of things constituting the category.Al There are two
aspects to this definition that are worthy of some attention here.
The first, which to some extent we have been assuming all along,
is that cognitive categories relate not merely to objects but also to
people. When we glance out our window, we see not only
different types of motor vehicles, buildings, and trees; we are also
apt to see different "types" of people. The existence of these
different types of people is, of course, largely the result of the
shared social classifications that we have, over time, collectively
come to construct.
As with objects, when we encounter a new person, we
encounter an entity with certain physical properties or an entity of
a certain form, even a certain color. And as with object perception,
upon encountering a person, we need to mentally process the
nature of the entity that stands before us to try to understand its
41.

Id.atlll.
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function in our lives and discern in what ways we are to react to it.
Of course, person perception also differs significantly from object
perception, in large part because persons behave in ways intended
to affect us.42 A person might approach us seeming somewhat
melancholy, which might cause us to categorize him as depressed,
and from which we might infer that his approach signals an appeal
for comfort, concern, or cheer. Or a person might come across as
wildly uninhibited and flirtatious, which might cause us to
categorize him as promiscuous, and from which we might infer
that his approach signals an amorous interest. A typical object, of
course, can be neither depressed nor interested in romance.
Person perception also differs significantly from object
perception in terms of the consequences of any serious
misperception. If we are mistaken, either in our classification of a
particular person, or in ascribing a characteristic to an entire
category of people, the result may be undeserved social stigma or
harmful stereotypes. Indeed, the possibility of such mis- or
irrational categorization brings to the fore the second important
aspect of our definition of a category; that is, that a category is a
"grouping based on the important or essential features that define
the class of things constituting the category. ' '43 In his study of
prejudice, Allport, following the so-called "classical view" of
social classification, approached the idea that categories are
defined through their essential features by distinguishing rational
from irrational categories. 44 Consider, for example, the category of
automobiles. According to Allport, we might quite rationally say
that all automobiles exhibit (or, at least, at some point did exhibit)
the potential for ground transport upon a wheel base. Some
automobiles will also contain powerful engines while others will
be less aggressive; some will be quite large while others are
relatively small, and so on. To say, however, that all automobiles
are large or powerful or, for that matter, green, would be irrational,
since these aspects are not essential to the category.45 And so with
categories of people. We know that there are Jews and Christians
and Muslims; we know that there are lawyers and dentists and
acrobats; we know that there are goths and punks and preppies.
Each person category, regardless of its derivation, will have,
according to Allport, some essential or defining characteristics,
though it will often be difficult to discern precisely what these
42. On the similarities and differences between object and person
perception, see id. at 16-20.
43. Id. at 111 (emphasis added).
44. Allport, supra note 34, at 22-23; Moskowitz, supra note 35, at 114.
45. See Moskowitz, supra note 35, at 171.
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essential characteristics might be. Take, for example, the category
of Muslims, the defining characteristic of which likelX relates to
one's association with a particular religious tradition. 61 Beyond
this religious affiliation, there is probably no other essential
characteristic that accurately describes the category. Yet, there
may exist any number of ascriptively derived characteristics
irrationally associated with the category; for example, that
Muslims tend to be dangerous, or even terroristic. Such an
ascription in the categorization of persons obviously can result in
treacherous social stigmas or stereotypes in a sense unparalleled in
the irrational categorization of non-social objects.
Allport's perspective on the nature and origins of stigma and
stereotype has remained highly influential within social and
cognitive psychology. Yet, his more rigorous view of the nature of
categories as embodying certain essential characteristics, without
which the category simply would not exist, has given way to a
more subtle conception of constitutive or defining categorical
characteristics. Indeed, the distinction between Allport's classical
view of the nature of social categories and its more modem
counterpart tracks, in a certain fashion, the distinction between
legal formalism and legal realism. To be a member of a social
category, under Allport's classical conception, an individual would
need to possess or display each and every characteristic deemed
essential to the category.
Moreover, as each such defining
characteristic would be deemed essential, each would also be
considered equally critical to membership.47
More recent
developments in cognitive and experimental psychology, however,
have demonstrated that both of these assumptions are problematic.
First, note that one consequence of the classical perspective should
be that every member of a particular social category should be
essentially identical to, or interchangeable with, every other
member of the category according to the characteristic deemed
essential. Yet, it simply is not the case that every member of a
socially recognizable category will be uniformly descriptive of the
category. As Moskowitz suggests, "not all African Americans are
equally representative of the category 'African Americans.' Tiger
Woods is classified by most people as a member of the category...
but he is not perhaps as representative of the group as other famous
members' 8of the category one could imagine, such as Jesse
Jackson. A
46. See Allport, supra note 34, at 171-72 (making this point with respect to
the person category of Jews).
47. See Moskowitz, supra note 35, at 114.
48. Id.
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Second, more recent experimentation in social cognition seems
to have belied the notion that categories can be described in terms
of necessary or essential traits. For instance, in one well-known
set of experiments, the cognitive psychologist Eleanor Rosch put a
series of statements to research participants in the form, "X is a Y,"
where X stood for some species that varied in the extent to which
the species was an obvious example of the static category Y; for
example, "A cardinal is a bird," as opposed to, "An ostrich is a
bird.' 9 The participants were asked to respond simply by
designating each statement as true or false. However, the true
indicator relied upon by Rosch in the study was not whether the
participants responded correctly but rather how long it took the
participants to respond. Rosch hypothesized that if categories
possess essential elements, then there should be no appreciable
difference in response time as the variable X is revised. Every
species X either is or is not a member of category Y, and if there is
a certain set of essential characteristics that describes Y's
membership, then cognitive processing time should be essentially
equivalent across all Xs.
The experiment consistently
demonstrated, however, that there was in fact a meaningful time
lag as the indicated species became a less typical representative of
the category.
Rosch's and similar studies have caused an evolution in the
way that cognitive psychologists view the nature of categories.
Rather than conceptualizing categories as constituted by essential
criteria, the absence of any of which precludes membership in the
category, modem social cognition theory describes categories in
more fluid terms. A category does indeed possess a set of
"important," if not wholly "essential," characteristics that define its
membership, but not every important or defining characteristic
need be present for an accurate categorization to occur.
Moskowitz provides an illuminating illustration: "Your mental
image of a chair is likely to have a back. But if you were to take
away the back, the object would still retain its category
membership. If you were to remove the arms, once again, the
object would remain a chair." 50 Yet, as the object displays more of
the important or defining categorical attributes, or as the object
approaches the cognitive paradigm that may lie at its center, the
accuracy of the categorization becomes more and more apparent.
49. See Eleanor Rosch, Cognitive Representations of Semantic Categories,
104 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 192 (1975); Eleanor Rosch, Natural
Categories, 4 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 329 (1973). These studies are described
and analyzed in Moskowitz, supra note 35, at 115.
50. Moskowitz, supra note 35, at 116.
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And, once again, as with categories of objects, so with categories
of people. For instance, what traits must one display to be
considered Asian? Clearly, physical attributes may play some role,
but so might history, geography, language, culture, and so on.
Hence, an individual who lives in Minneapolis and was born of a
Korean mother and a Norwegian father might accurately be
described as "Asian," and so might the child of an Israeli mother
and a Pakistani father, but surely there also exist other individuals
more representative of the social category "Asian," at least in its
The social category lacks essential
American conception.
characteristics, but as an individual displays or exhibits more of the
important or defining categorical attributes, his membership in the
category becomes more obvious.
Note, then, the sense in which the more recent developments in
cognitive psychology have demonstrated that categories
themselves will be indeterminate, for this bears critically on the
processes that give rise to such categories, including the processes
that give rise to categories of human beings. As we move from the
center of a category to its periphery, we encounter characteristics
that are marginally less crucial to category membership. So, for
example, the criterion "grows from a seed" is more central to and
definitive of the category trees than is "bears fruit" or "has leaves,"
since we pretty clearly would want to both exclude tomato plants
but include pine trees in the category trees. Yet, both "bears fruit"
and "has leaves" are helpful in filling out our description of the
category trees; they are peripheral rather than central category
criteria. 1 This conceptualization of categories as possessing both
central and peripheral criteria results in what is essentially a spatial
metaphor, or a cognitive psychological mapping of categories, that
reflects a social world of overlapping categories with relatively
indistinct borders. As Moskowitz describes it:
If each category contains some features that reside at the
periphery, it is reasonable to assume that overlap of
different categories is likely to occur, and that this will be
especially likely to occur at the border between the
categories, where the two peripheries meet and the less
central features are shared. That is, each category has its
boundaries, since it is defined by a set of properties that are
more or less central. The qualities that define a category
and the boundaries that limit membership in a category are
52
"fuzzy," in that they lack discrete and clear demarcations.
51. Id.at 115-16.
52. Id.
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The categories remain within this conception, but their form
becomes slightly more amorphous, their limits less definite. As a
result, membership itself becomes less certain or more in need of
interpretation. Indeed, as presaged above, the modem conception
in cognitive psychology of categories as "fuzzy sets" contrasts
with the classical conception of categories as constituted by certain
essential characteristics in a fashion that effectively parallels the
distinction in American jurisprudence between legal formalism and
legal realism.
In brief, legal formalism stands for the proposition that
particular legal controversies can often be resolved merely through
reference to, and mechanical deduction from, authoritative legal
resources. Legal realism, on the other hand, doubts that this is so,
maintaining instead that most legal reasoning simply masks what
are in fact controversial and indeterminate questions of moral
value or public policy. 53 In other words, formalism describes legal
analysis that moves easily and determinately from category to
judgment, and legal realism is skeptical both of the existence of
such categories and of the motivations for the judgments that
result.
One well-known case provides a good illustration from which
to appreciate the principal difference between these two
perspectives on law. United States v. E. C. Knight5 4 was decided
toward the end of the nineteenth century, during a period in which
legal formalism was dominant in American legal thought. In E.C.
Knight, the Supreme Court decided that the Sherman Antitrust Act
should be deemed inapplicable to a potential monopoly involved in
the manufacture of sugar. 55 The majority reasoned that, pursuant
to the Constitution's Commerce Clause, the federal government
had authority only
to regulate "commerce" in sugar and not its
"manufacture., 56 In so doing, the Court divided regulatory
authority between the federal and state governments on the basis of
a formalist, or categorical, analysis: activities that fell within the
category "commerce" came within the control of the federal
government, whereas conduct that could be classified merely as
53. This is, of course, the "sound bite" version of a distinction that has
occupied generations of legal theorists. For a more detailed description of what
is involved in a claim of legal formalism, see Martin Stone, Formalism, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 166-205
(Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002); and on legal realism, see Brian Bix,
JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 177-87 (3d ed. 2004).
54. 156 U.S. 1(1895).
55. Id.at 17-18.
56. Id.at 13-14. For the text of the Commerce Clause, see U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 3.
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"manufacture" fell without "commerce," and so lied within the
sphere of the several states.5 7 Most critically, the Court treated its
categorization of sugar refining as manufacturing rather than as
commerce as if that conclusion simply followed mechanically from
categorical criteria. "Commerce," the Court reasoned, "succeeds
to manufacture, and is not a part of it." 58 In contrast, a realist jurist
might have noted the conspicuous, and indeed massive, impact that
the American Sugar Refining Company's ninety-eight percent
monopoly in sugar refining would surely have on interstate
commerce in that good. 59 The legal formalist majority in E.C.
Knight sought to justify its decision by claiming that it was simply
proceeding deductively from category to conclusion, whereas the
realist perspective would regard both manufacturing and
commerce not as precise categories but as "fuzzy sets," leaving a
substantial degree of room for interpretation and policy-making.
Once we combine the idea that law categorizes persons with
the understanding that social categories are themselves largely
indeterminate, it is no great distance to see how it is that legal
institutions will, at times, play a substantial role in influencing
aspects of our social identities. To see why this is so, consider one
prominent piece of legislation, the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"). 6P The ADA seeks to limit discrimination in the
workplace and in the provision of public services and
accommodations on the basis of an individual's disability. Above,
we observed that the ADA's investitive generality necessarily
engenders a class of rights-bearers. 61 Here, notice too that the
class engendered by the ADA, composed as it is by, and of,
individual human beings, is also a cognitive social category.
According to the classical view of social categorization, there
should be some essential criteria that describe the category of
"disabled" persons. And, indeed, the Act contains investitive
criteria that, in an effort to serve formal justice and legal
generality, seek to describe the class of rights-bearers in specific
terms. As we have seen, the ADA affords a right against
discrimination to persons who exhibit "a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life

57. See E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 12 ("That which belongs to commerce is
within the jurisdiction of the United States, but that which does not belong to
commerce is within the jurisdiction of the police power of the State.").
58. Id.
59. See Bix, supra note 53, at 179.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2000).
61. See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-13 (2000).
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activities. '' 62 How successful is the right, then, in articulating
determinate criteria?
In fact, all three aspects of the ADA's definition of disability
clearly leave a significant amount of room for interpretation and
further policy-making. Hence, HIV infection has been determined
to constitute a "physical impairment," as has psoriasis and
tendonitis, but a ruptured aortic aneurysm has not. 63 And sleeping,
working, caring for oneself, and having sex have been deemed
"major life activities," but awareness, driving to work, household
cleaning, and reproduction generally have not.64 And, further,
whether any such major life activity is "substantially" limited by a
confirmed physical or mental impairment remains an additional
necessary inquiry, such that while "remembering" might be a
major life activity, the capacity to overcome mere "glitches" in
thinking following a stroke would render 65that limitation too
insubstantial to trigger the ADA's protections.
Now, my intent here certainly is not to wade into the modem
debate between legal formalists and legal realists over the
indeterminacy of legal rules. 66 Nor is it even truly controversial,
from either of these perspectives that legislation will frequently
be, at least in part, open-textured.&7 The point here is that although
formal justice does indeed engender categories of persons, most of
the time the social categories described by legal rules will in fact
be fuzzy sets. In light of the necessarily imprecise borders of
social categories constructed through law and in light of the
existence not only of essential but also numerous important
62. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000).

63. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) (HIV); Chanda v.
Engelhard/ICC, 234 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 2000) (tendonitis); Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio
Alzheimer's Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775 (6th Cir. 1998) (psoriasis); DeJoy v.
Comcast Cable Commc'ns., 968 F. Supp. 963 (D.N.J. 1997) (aortic aneurysm).
64. See e.g., Marinelli v. City of Erie, 216 F.3d 354 (3d Cir. 2000) (general
housework and cleaning); McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226
(9th Cir. 1999) (sleeping; sexual relations); Deas v. River West, L.P., 152 F.3d
471 (5th Cir. 1998) (awareness); Salamo Martinez v. Celulares Telefonica, Inc.,
272 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.P.R. 2003) (driving to work); Kidwell v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (D. Kan. 1999) (working; caring for
oneself); Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, 881 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. La. 1995)
(reproduction is not a "major life activity"). But see Pacourek v. Inland Steel
Co., 916 F. Supp. 797 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (reproduction is a "major life activity").
65. Hill v. Steven Motors, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1254-55 (D. Kan.
2002) (even if remembering is a "major life activity," mere glitches in thinking
after suffering stroke deemed insubstantial).
66. For modem explications of legal formalism, see, e.g., Frederick
Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988), and Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal
Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988).
67. See H.L.A. Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 127-28 (2d ed. 1997).
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peripheral investitive criteria for inclusion in the sets engendered
by legal rights, legal actors will possess a significant degree of
flexibility and influence in discerning similarities and differences
among rights-claimants. And this will be true, of course, not only
of the judicial and administrative actors charged with interpreting
and applying legislative pronouncements but also of the legislators
themselves, in whom responsibility has been placed for setting, if
not the precise boundaries of the categories of rights-bearers, then
at least their more general outlines. As similarities and differences
among rights-claimants are discerned by legal actors, and as the
contours of social categories are influenced by legal institutions,
the prospect for the legal constitution of social identity is raised.
IV. THE NATURE OF SOCIAL IDENTITY AND THE FUNCTION OF
SOCIAL SALIENCE

In our contemporary, rapidly and continually evolving
pluralistic societies, issues concerning social identity have become
increasingly prominent in public life and civic debate. It was not
always this way, however. In earlier centuries, social life and
group status were generally more constant, with one's social
identity largely settled from birth, and with little space for
meaningful self-invention thereafter. Our contemporary emphasis
on social identity has often been linked to the sorts of epic social
and political shifts, described by writers such as de Tocqueville
and Louis Hartz, from fixed statuses broadly to freedom of
contract. 68 Yet, analyses such as these tend to neglect the
persistent nature of inegalitarian ascriptive statuses, including
those manifestly at large at the time of both de Tocqueville's and
69
Hartz's writings, that continue to restrain lives even today.
Perhaps, along with factors associated with the increasing
heterogeneity of modern society, it has been the promise of
freedom, the enhanced possibility of individual self-invention,
even if it remains just out of reach, that has brought social identity
so prominently to the fore in recent decades. Whatever its cause,
the notion of social identity has come to dominate our
contemporary conceptions of who and what we are, our most

68. See Louis Hartz, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955); Alexis
de Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN
POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION (J.P. Mayer ed., 2d ed. 1988).
69.

See Smith, supra note 3, at 20-26.
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fundamental beliefs about our 70selves and our place among our
fellow members of our societies.
The modem notion of a collective identity has roots in
nineteenth and early twentieth century sociological conceptions of
collective social phenomena, such as Marx's evocation of a "class
consciousness," Durkheim's suggestion of a "collective
conscience," and Weber's methodological use of verstehen, or the
need for a deeper, more contextual understanding of purposive
human social behavior. 7 1 In these ways, the idea of collective
identity emphasizes, in an extremely broad manner, essential
connections and congruencies across persons within a given
society, culture, or political system-connections that figure on
virtually the deepest levels imaginable. More recently, however,
these structural or essentialist accounts of collective identity have
given way to narrower and more socially variable conceptions of
collective identities as sources for the various constituent aspects
of our social selves. Our collective identities today are still
perceived as powerful constitutive agents that shape social and
self-perceptions in dramatic ways but they are also viewed more as
social artifacts, or the product of interactive social forces,
including law.
Law, in its most general instantiation, presumes that there is a
universal human nature, marking an essential moral equivalence
across all persons. It is partly on this basis that rights, variously
termed natural, human, or general, may be said to be grounded.
Yet, even such ostensibly universal rights are, upon further
examination, far less so, and in this way contribute to the
constitution of differentiated social identities.7 2 One approach to
discerning the nature of social identity derives from this contrast
between the innate characteristics of a purportedly universal
human nature and the more fragmented aspects of our social
selves. In this sense, our social identity is conceptualized as a
sequence of symbolic components constructed atop, and
supplementing, our common basic natures. Social symbols such as
these, whether voluntarily adopted or imposed from without, serve
in combination to distinguish us from most others. They signify to
the world and to ourselves who and what we are in virtue of our
membership in a variety of social groups. The sociologist Norbert
Wiley, for example, describes the idea of social identity as
70. On the rise of interest in social identity more generally, see Howard,
supra note 36, at 367-68.
71. See Karen Cerulo, Identity Construction: New Issues, New Directions,
23 ANN. REv. Soc. 385, 386 (1997).
72. See Mitnick, supra note 18, at 194.
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representing "long-term, abiding qualities which, despite their
importance, are not features of human nature as such. Identities
individuate and allow us to recognize
individuals, categories,
' 73
groups, and types of individuals."
Social identity has been studied most attentively from within
the fields of sociology and psychology, and sociological and
psychological conceptions of the idea differ in important ways. As
one might expect, most fundamentally, the sociological perspective
looks at the notion of social identity from the view of society and
focuses especially on the groups and categories that provide social
labels for their members." The psychological conception, on the
other hand, focuses on the individual's social memberships from
the individual's own perspective--that is, on the understanding
one takes of and from one's membership in various social
groups. 75 In the former conception, then, it is external social
identification and our reaction to such labeling that is the
predominant consideration. On this view, we are the person we are
socially acknowledged as being, though we may be, at least,
partially successful in countering unwanted social definitions. In
the latter conception, social identity is frequently appraised
through reference to one's "self-concept," with a particular
emphasis on the ways in which the individual's internal selfconception is cognitively constructed in light of one's social
memberships. At the same time, though, there is a significant
degree of convergence between the two perspectives, especially in
virtue of the mutually recognized influence that external social
labeling has on the individual's internal self-concept.
Social identity is also usefully conceptualized in contrast to
personal identity. Note, however, that by invoking "personal
identity," we might be appealing to more than one conception of
the idea. In its more dated connotation, roughly that generally in
use prior to the second World War and indeed still operative today
within the discipline of the philosophy of mind, the idea of
personal identity is concerned especially with the question of the
continuity of the individual over time. This is consistent, of
course, with one of the primary meanings of the term "identity," an
73.

Norbert Wiley, The Politics of Identity in American History, in SOCIAL
130 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1994).
74. See especially the seminal work of Erving Goffman, STIGMA: NOTES ON
THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963).
Also see the helpful
discussion in Timothy J. Owens, Self and Identity, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 205, 224 (John Delamater ed., 2003).
75. Here, see especially the seminal work done by Henri Tajfel, HUMAN
THEORY AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY

GROUPS AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES: STUDIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1981),

also discussed in Owens, supra note 74, at 224.
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essential sameness across different contexts. Hence, references to
personal identity are sometimes intended to raise "the question of
the sameness, or identity, of a substance, continuant, or thing,
through different changes in time and space." 76 It is, though, an
alternative sense of the term "personal identity" to which writers in
political and social theory commonly make reference today. As
Joseph Raz has written:
When talking of "identity" I do not mean the term in the
sense in which it fixes the limits of the continuity of an
object, or an object of a kind: is this pile of timber which
made up Theseus' boat Theseus' boat still? We mean7 the
identity revealed in answers to the question who am 1?
It is this latter sense of personal identity, this sense of identity
as composed of elements of our larger selves rather than the sense
of identity concerned with the endurance of an entity through time,
that is most effective in providing the sort of contrast helpful in
revealing the nature of social identity. As Anthony Appiah has
suggested:
Each person's individual identity is seen as having two
major dimensions. There is a collective dimension, the
intersection of their collective identities, and there is a
personal dimension, consisting of other socially or morally
important features-intelligence, charm, wit, cupidity-that
78
are not themselves the basis of forms of collective identity.
Appiah's reference here to the collective dimension of an
individual's identity is intended to elicit reflection upon those
aspects of one's social identity--e.g., race, gender, ethnicity-that
figure so prominently in legal and political discourse today. The
personal dimension of individual identity pertains to characteristics
of that which we might more commonly designate our individual
personalities, such as a person's penchant for being charming or
76. John Rawls, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 32 n.34 (1993). See also Kwame
Anthony Appiah, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY 283 n.6 (2005).
77. Joseph Raz, VALUE, RESPECT, AND ATrACHMENT 33 (2001).
78. Kwame Anthony Appiah, Identity, Authenticity and Survival:
Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction, in MULTICULTURALISM:
EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RELIGION 151 (Charles Taylor ed., 1994). For a
similar perspective, operative in social psychology, see Glynis M. Breakwell,
Introduction to SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF IDENTITY AND THE SELF CONCEPT 3-4
(Glynis M. Breakwell ed., 1992) ("Personal identity is that part of the self
concept which is unique to the individual, a product of purposive action. Social
identity, in contrast, is that part of the self concept derived from group and
category memberships.").
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witty. Put another way, social identity arises and is defined in
virtue of our social memberships, whereas personal identity is
composed of the sort of idiosyncratic traits that serve to
differentiate us as individuals. 79 Hence, where social identity
provides bases upon which our common human nature might be
supplemented, thereby differentiating categories of persons in
socially meaningful ways, personal identity ensures that members
of collectivities, despite their common and deeply constitutive
affiliations, nonetheless remain differentiated and unique
individuals.
This, in combination with the realization that
individual members commonly differ in their relations with even
the most intensely constitutive social categories,
ultimately belies
°"
essentialist conceptions of social identity.
The list of collective identity types by now is a common one.
Throughout the literatures on identity in cultural studies, law,
political science, religion, sociology, social psychology, etc., the
list remains essentially the same: race, gender, ethnicity, sexuality,
class, religion, age, nationality, and, more recently, disability. At
times, depending upon the particular discipline and the author's
specific predilections, identities related to social movements
geography, and even technology might enter the frame as well.8f
Why these identity types? Why are we so likely to be identified,
and to identify ourselves, in terms of our race, ethnicity, gender,
and so on? Why not the size of our ear lobes, our eye color, or, for
that matter, our weakness at the prospect of chocolate ice cream?
What is it that makes socially salient human characteristics socially
salient? As we have said, not all legal rules are constitutive of
human social identity; only those rules, the investitive criteria of
which correspond to socially salient characteristics, may be said to
be constitutive in a meaningful sense. Hence, attempting to
decipher the enigma of social salience will be critical if we are to
discern the basis for law's constitutive influence.
We saw in the previous section that categorization is an
endemic aspect of human social perception and cognition. We
categorize virtually all aspects of our social world, including
characteristics exhibited by our fellow human beings. Experiments
undertaken by cognitive psychologists have demonstrated that
79. On social identity as a cognitive schema, see Howard, supra note 36, at

368-69.

80. See Liebkind, supra note 17, at 159 ("[P]eople do not identify in an all
or none fashion with the values and characteristics of various groups and
individuals. They usually identify with some and dissociate themselves from
others, i.e., they form only part-identifications with individuals and groups.").
81. See Cerulo, supra note 71, at 398 (technology); Howard, supra note 36,
at 374-84 (social movements; geography).
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certain types of human characteristics are more likely to initiate
social categorization-that is, to be socially salient--than others.
Moskowitz describes the nature of the human characteristics that
have a greater tendency to grab our attention, and the concept of
social salience, in the following way:
Some information is prominent in the perceptual field and
seems to leap out from the background/context, making it
figural and attention-grabbing.
Its prominence in the
context renders it able to capture attention and have a
greater impact on our cognitive processing than stimuli (or
features of stimuli) that are less prominent.
Such
information is said to be salient, or to have increased
salience . . . The concept of salience informs us that there
are features of the things we observe, the "data" in our
social world, that are more powerful at directing
our
82
attention and influencing our responses than others.
Further, that which we perceive to be the cause of some event
or circumstance-including which person or group of persons we
perceive to be the cause, and, as a consequence, blame, for some
poor state of affairs-is often largely a function of cognitive
processes operating in reaction to the presence of socially salient
characteristics. 83 As Allport commented, "Even a fragment of
visibility . . . focuses people's minds on the possibility that
everything may be related to this fragment." 84 The potential for
dangerous stereotypes, scapegoating, and group prejudice are,
then, manifest, as we ascribe responsibility on the basis of social
salience.
Human beings, we have said, mentally cannot process the
entirety of our perceptual field. Out of the nearly limitless data
points that we encounter in any given social interaction, we will in
reality have the capacity to attend to very few. How then do we
cognitively select among such a wealth of sensory information?
And, in particular, how do we do so with respect to characteristics
of our fellow human beings? Borrowing from long recognized
research on the role of salience in object perception, social and
cognitive psychologists have demonstrated that certain types of
features exhibited by persons have a tendency to capture our

82. Moskowitz, supra note 35, at 53.

83. Id. at 54.

84. Allport, supra note 34, at 108-09.
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attention and become socially salient. 85 These features include
properties such as the relative intensity or vividness with which a
characteristic is displayed or a behavior performed, the contextual
novelty of such a characteristic, and the extent to which particular
behavior is norm-violative, threatening, or dangerous. 86 Further,
the capacity of a stimulus to form a unit with other stimuli tends to
increase perceived salience and causal attribution. For instance, a
Catholic politician viewed praying in church might cognitively be
categorized as a Catholic given the contextual salience of religion
but then later categorized as a politician when seen vigorously
shaking hands with congregants after the service. In both such
situations, either aspect of the individual's social identity might
have been deemed salient, but that aspect that forms a unit with the
individual's behavior will tend to become prominent and command
attention.
The idea that we tend cognitively to categorize persons
according to those characteristics that are most apt to capture our
attention would seem to make sense of certain prominent social
categories differentiated by marked, highly visual, physical traits.
Skin color, which has long been taken as a basis for the social
87
construction of racial classifications, is one obvious example.
Similarly, disabilities, differences in age and gender, and certain
religious and ethnic customs, such as dress or patterns of speech,
supply external, visual, and aural physical distinctions that may
capture attention and so trigger categorization. Indeed, consider
why it is that we are here able to jointly discuss and assess
common social groups. This is possible only insofar as the
categories that we come cognitively to construct may be shared
across individuals within a given society or culture. 81 In part, this
reflects the considerable role that physicality plays in the
construction of social categories, since our external physical
differences are available for all to see and (over)emphasize.
Human physical characteristics, insofar as they are contextually
85. On the properties of objects that capture attention, see Leo Postman,
Jerome S. Bruner & Elliott McGinnies, PersonalFactorsAs Selective Factors in
Perception,43 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 142 (1948).
86. On the relationship between object and person perception and the social
salience of human characteristics, see Moskowitz, supra note 35, at 54-60.
87. On the relationship between skin color and the construction of racial
categories, see Amy Gutmann, Responding to Racial Injustice, in K. Anthony
Appiah & Amy Gutmann, COLOR CoNscIous: THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF
RACE 106, 112-18 (1996).
88. See Moskowitz, supra note 35, at 117-19. Moskowitz's point, though,
is that social categories are shared not merely as a result of our common
perception of physical traits but also in virtue of common cultural theories. Id.
This point is expanded on below.
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novel, become cognitively salient and thereby serve as the basis for
social categorization that leads to the construction of social groups.
Yet, while features like apparent contextual novelty might seem to
explain the social cognitive salience of a physical trait like skin
color, why then have social groups failed to form around other
obvious physical differences, such as eye or hair color? Why is it
that certain contextually novel human characteristics capture
attention but not others? In fact, both lay and professional
experimentation seem to have demonstrated the potential salience
of virtually any apparent physical difference.
One well-known and highly controversial such experiment was
conducted by Jane Elliott, an elementary school teacher in the
small town of Riceville, Iowa, soon after the assassination of
Martin Luther King, Jr.
In an effort to have her third grade
students attempt truly to comprehend the nature of discrimination,
Elliott divided her students into two groups differentiated
according to the relatively meaningless criterion of eye color.
Elliott then made that criterion socially meaningful. On alternate
days, blue-eyed and brown-eyed members of the class were treated
by Elliott and the rest of the class as either inferior or privileged
categories of persons by, for example, segregating and
"ghettoizing" the inferior set, marking the inferior set with special
collars, permitting the privileged group to eat lunch first and
denying the inferior group second servings, and otherwise
suggesting that students who fell within the inferior category were
of lesser intelligence and humanity than those in the superior set.
The impact on Elliott's students was quite powerful, dramatically
altering their conceptions of themselves in relation to their fellow
students. For instance, when asked to describe his feelings as a
member, first, of the privileged category, student Raymond Hansen
said, "I felt like a king, like I ruled them brown-eyes. Like I was
better than them. Happy." And later, Hansen, discussing his
experience as a member of the inferior set, commented, "I felt
down, unhappy, like I couldn't do anything, like I was tied up and
couldn't get loose." 90 While her method was surely lacking in
certain controls, the results of Elliott's classroom experiment
compellingly demonstrate the extensive capacity for human social
construction of collective identity types on the basis of highly
apparent physical differences. Indeed, the social psychologists
Judith Howard and Daniel Renfrow have suggested that Elliott's
experiment effectively reveals the ways in which "characteristics
89. For a helpful discussion of Elliott's experiment, see generally William
Peters, A CLASS DIVIDED: THEN AND Now (1987).
90. Id. at 78.
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that have no inherent social meaning can become meaningful in
particular social configurations, and they then may be used to
define groups of people and used9 1in making attributions about the
members of those social groups."
Certain studies conducted by social psychologists concerning
social cognition of physical differences confirm these findings. In
one such study, two bearded men, one with red hair and the other
with brown, were videotaped in conversation. 92 The researchers
placed wholly unrelated photographs behind each of the men.
Videotapes of the conversation were shown to participants in the
study, and the participants were then asked to recall features of the
images in the photographs. The researchers' theory was that since
red hair is a relatively novel characteristic, participants' attention,
all things equal, should be captured more by the man with the red
hair than by the man with the brown hair. The man with the red
hair would be cognitively more salient, and participants would pay
closer attention to the red-haired man and his surroundings and so
would be more apt to recall aspects of the image in the photograph
behind that man. The obvious question, of course, is how the
experimenters determined that it was the man's hair color, rather
than simply the nature of the images themselves, that served as the
source of salience. This the researchers attempted to control by
alternating whether the tape was shown in color or in black-andwhite. They found that when the tape was shown in black-andwhite, there were no significant differences in participants' recall
of the images placed behind the two men; in other words, neither
man or picture was especially salient. But when the tape was
shown in color, participants indeed were able to recall features of
the image placed behind the man with red hair with greater
accuracy than the image placed behind the man with brown hair.
The researchers concluded that the red-haired man's hair color was
relatively novel and, on that basis, cognitively more salient,
93
leading participants to attend more closely to his surroundings.
91.

Judith A. Howard & Daniel G. Renfrow, Social Cognition, in

HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 259, 272 (John Delamater ed., 2003).

92. See Leslie Zebrowitz McArthur & Elise Ginsberg, Causal Attribution to
Salient Stimuli: An Investigation of Visual Fixation Mediators, 7 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 547, 548 (1981). In addition to the videotape with
contrasting hair color, the researchers also created and used two other
videotapes. In the first of these, one actor wore a boldly striped shirt while the
other wore a plain grey shirt, and in the other, one actor wore a leg brace while
the other did not. Id. The findings on salience and causal attribution were
comparable to those derived from the hair color video. Id. at 550.
93. See Moskowitz, supra note 35, at 55-56. Surprisingly, no mention is
made, either by Moskowitz or by the researchers themselves, of whether the
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Experiments such as these appear to demonstrate that virtually
any contextually novel and highly apparent physical human
characteristic might become cognitively salient, serving as the
trigger for social categorization, and in this way underlying, at
least in part, the social construction of a collective identity group.
The question that remains, however, is why certain physical traits,
such as skin color, have served as the basis for the identification of
social identity groups, and other traits, such as eye or hair color,
have not. This is the point at which, perhaps surprisingly, the
theories involved in most of the literature concerned with the
nature and construction of social identity seem to come to an end.
The question is a compelling one, however. Physicality combined
with contextual novelty clearly might serve as a basis upon which
persons may be cognitively categorized, but other social factors
must be involved if we are to explain the obvious differential
salience of racial, gender, and other social identities. What, in
combination with highly apparent physical traits, causes the
construction of social identity?
Those who do consider the question point alternatively to
power relations among persons in society, deeply embedded
cultural norms, and, relatedly, a history that, to some extent, may
have been lost to time. For instance, with respect to the influence
of power arrangements on the constitution of social salience, there
is a still developing sociohistorical literature in the constructionist
vein that proposes the dominance of elites in the conception and
94
manipulation of collective identities and associated schemas.
Similarly, social psychologists interested especially in the
derivation of collective identities based upon supposed racial
differences have suggested the criticality of racist ideology to the
social construction of racialized groups. 95 The generation and
sustainment of such ideology, they suggest, is a product of "power
relationships and social practices that affect who is able to act on
the basis of their category constructions, make them heard, and
impose them on others." 9 Hence, where the superior resources

photographs themselves might have become more salient once they were shown
in color. See McArthur & Ginsberg, supra note 92.
94. For a review of this literature, see Cerulo, supra note 71, at 390.
Though it is not typically advanced in relation to collective identities, this theme
would also be consistent with much of the work published within critical legal
studies. For an overview, see generally Kelman, supra note 13.
95. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 36, at 386 (citing Nicholas Hopkins,
Steven Reicher & Mark Levine, On the ParallelsBetween Social Cognition and
the "New Racism, " 36 BRrr. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 305 (1997)).
96. Id.

2007]

LEGAL IDENTITY AND SOCIAL COGNITION

853

enjoyed by members of dominant groups may enhance their own
capacity for autonomous self-construction, that material and
political superiority also provides the ascendant category with "the
discursive power to define, locate, and order" the social identities
of members of dominated groups. 97 Personal aspects of identity,
thus, may become more salient for members of privileged groups,
but externally defined social group memberships remain most
critical for socially subordinated persons, both in defining their
social identities and their own self-concepts. In short, as Howard
and Renfrow suggest, "power based upon social
98 position has a
major impact on social and self-categorizations.
Beyond, or in combination with, physicality and power
arrangements, history and culture may also be critical determinants
of social salience. As noted above, in part due to our common
perception of external physical traits, social categories tend to be
shared. But such categories are also common across people in a
given society or culture in virtue of the theories inculcated and the
narratives taught to individuals by their cultures. Allport, for
instance, tells the story of a small, remote Guatemalan community
in which there existed an extreme, almost mythic, form of antiSemitism, despite the fact that not a single resident of the
community had ever come into contact with a Jewish person:
How did the Jew-is-to-be-hated category grow up? In the
first place, the community was strongly Catholic. Teachers
had told the residents that the Jews were Christ-killers. It
also so happened that in the local culture was an old pagan
myth about a devil who killed a god. Thus two powerfully
emotional ideas converged
and created a hostile
99
prejudgment of Jews.

Whether or not Allport's tale is apocryphal, it illustrates the
deep sense in which socially salient differences may be culturally
constructed. If we find skin color, gender, nationality, religion,
and the like to be socially salient, this will be due, in part, to the
presence of contextually novel physical differences among persons
and power imbalances used to emphasize and exploit those
differences. But it will also be due, in no small measure, to the
myths and narratives, the structural and symbolic resources, of
families, tribes, and broader cultural groups.
The cultural
construction of social salience thus reflects the possibility of a
collective form of self-determination as any given ethnic, religious,
97. Howard & Renfrow, supra note 91, at 273.
98. Id.
99. Allport, supra note 34, at 22.
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or other cultural group, consciously or unconsciously,
differentiates itself from broader social categories. Of course,
cultural or collective self-determination is no guarantee of
individual autonomy. With the socially constitutive capacity of
culture comes the continued prospect of ascription and domination,
now simply refocused at the cultural group level. Cultural elites or
majorities often have the power to shape internally salient
differences among group members, and vulnerable individuals or
sub-grous may be unfairly labeled and subordinated in the
process. ' p" Both as to elites and subordinated cultural group
members, though, the crucial point here is that socially salient
differences among persons are, in significant part, a consequence
of culturally constructed theories and narratives.
Cultural differences that influence human perceptions of social
salience may be based on relatively recent religious or political
schisms or other social divarications, or they may derive from
events and circumstances now lost to the haze of time. The
historically more ancient bases for cultural variation are sometimes
referred to as "deep history" or "deep culture," reflecting the long
entrenched and seemingly innate cultural characteristics ingrained
within language, certain religious beliefs, and views of the world
and the nature of human existence.' 0 ' Along these lines, the broad,
and much remarked upon, distinction between Eastern and
Western cultures offers an illustration. Suk Chang, for instance,
describes Asian cultural conceptions of the self in far more2
relational terms than we are accustomed to in Western societies.10
Where Western cultures tend to foster individualistic thinking and
virtues, the socially salient aspects of human life in Eastern
cultures tend more toward relations with families, communities,
nature, and the universe. Indeed, the very notion of an individual
human identity in its Western conception may be absent in Eastern
and other cultural contexts. 3 Such far-reaching and deeply
embedded differences as these arise primarily from an ancient past
about which we can only speculate, and yet deep cultural
differences continue to influence our contemporary perceptions of
social salience in dramatic ways.

100. On the vulnerability of cultural sub-groups, especially women and
children, see generally Ayelet Shachar, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS:
CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS (2001).
101. On the nature and effects of "deep culture," see Liebkind, supra note 17,
at 149.
102. See Suk C. Chang, The Self A Nodal Issue in Culture and Psyche-An
Eastern Perspective, 36 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 67 (1982).
103. See Liebkind, supra note 17, at 149.
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Within cognitive psychology, deep cultural differences, such as
the Eastern-Western cultural divide referenced in the previous
paragraph, are sometimes thought to result not merely in varied
interpretations of social circumstances and human behavior but,
more fundamentally, in different cognitive styles through which
those interpretations arise.' °4 If this is the case, it may be that
profound differences in culture result in materially different modes
of human social cognition, thereby rendering even our most basic
mechanisms for discerning social salience sensitive to cultural
variation. In a recent archival study, Michael Morris and Kaiping
Peng suggest that Western cultures, with their powerful, nearly
endemic emphasis on the democratic and autonomous nature of
human beings, produce in their citizens cognitive orientations
particularly sensitive to these values. 10 5 As a result, Morris and
Peng contend, persons raised within a more individualistic cultural
environment will be more likely to perceive individual traits and
10 6
dispositions as the primary causes of human behavior.
Individuals who develop cognitively within Eastern cultures, on
the other hand, where social relations and collective virtues are
more prominent, will acquire a more collectivist cognitive style
and so will tend to discern explanations for human behavior in
social terms. 10 7 In an effort to discern the influence of cultural
difference along these lines, Morris and Peng observed the ways in
which acts of murder were described in two newspapers. 08 The
newspapers were based in the same city, but served different
readerships-American and Chinese.
Where the American
reporter's account of the murder emphasized the particular
characteristics and nature of the individual murderer, the Chinese
reporter's account focused more intently on the social
circumstances surrounding the murder. 10 9 According to Morris
and Peng, the different emphases displayed in the newspaper
reports reflect the way in which cultural differences may influence
social cognition and attribution." 0 Cognitive styles developed
within different cultural contexts appear to alter the way in which
human beings perceive, construe, and categorize the social

104. See Moskowitz, supra note 35, at 117-19.
105. Michael W. Morris & Kaiping Peng, Culture and Cause: American and
Chinese Attributions for Social andPhysical Events, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 949 (1994).
106. Id. at 958-62.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 962.
110. Id. at961.
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world."' The cognitive schemas with which we approach and
frame the world would seem to be, in significant part, a bequest
from our religions, our cultures, and our ancestors.
Social salience, then, is a consequence of a number of complex
and interrelated cognitive and social factors. Physicality, power
relations, cultural differences, and deep history all may play a role
in the construction of collective identity types. Moreover, social
salience, and social group membership, is self-sustaining, to a great
extent. Once a human characteristic becomes socially salient, the
characteristic will then carry information that will be perceived as
useful in drawing inferences and planning behavior within any
given social system. If cognitively we operate by virtue of
categorization and inference, then naturally we will have a
tendency to focus on those features around which inferences
abound. So, for instance, since skin color has been a socially
salient characteristic for so long, and a great deal of social
information (i.e., stereotypes) has therefore become attached to the
characteristic, cognitively we will attend to differences in skin
color much more regularly and with greater intensity than we will
an information-poor trait such as eye or hair color. "Some
features, such as race and gender," Moskowitz has written, "have
natural informational value because of a rich history of stereotypes
'
and beliefs and inferences that perceivers feel they can lean on." 12
Another way of putting this is that a socially salient feature's very
utility as a socially salient feature will capture our attention,
thereby reinforcing the feature's social salience. Where, as so
often with skin color, the socially salient information is false and
oppressive, a vicious cycle of subordination results.
By the time a social or cultural characteristic such as race,
gender, or disability is brought into service as a legally investitive
criterion, the characteristic typically will have long been socially
salient.
Indeed, the embedment of a social or cultural
characteristic within a particular legal rule may be viewed as a
long-fought-for achievement, as with certain cultural rights of
recognition and rights granted to persons with disabilities. On the
other hand, inegalitarian ascriptive labels have also often found a
too congenial home in law, and it has in many cases taken
centuries to disengage an individual's legal status from these
oppressive categories. In both of these cases, however, legal actors
and institutions have taken those characteristics that have become
socially salient in light of physical differences and power relations
among persons, and by virtue of cultural forces and deep history,
111. Moskowitz, supra note 35, at 118.
112. Id.
at64.
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and have reinforced their social salience by setting them down as
legal rights and corresponding burdens; by making them, that is,
legally salient. Further, as a social and cultural practice in its own
right, the law functions also as an agent of socialization or as a
social mechanism enabling the spread and further construction of
social conceptions regarding the categories of persons described by
legal rules. It is to this process that we now turn.
V. SOCIAL LABELING AND LAW

As AN

AGENT OF SOCIALIZATION

In describing the nature of categories, we have said that there
are not merely categories of objects but categories of persons as
well. These social categories are well-known to us and play a
substantial role in our everyday lives. Indeed, it has long been
customary to think of these social categories-whether composed
in light of nationality, religion, sexuality, race, etc.-as
representing different types of people. That this sort of social
classification is commonplace appears beyond question, but what
does it mean to say that there are different "types" of people?
According to which social processes do these different types
emerge? And what role does law play in their emergence?
Recently, the first two of these questions have garnered
considerable attention, particularly within cultural, identity, and
lesbian and gay studies. Theorists writing from within these
literatures suggest that the primary commonality among different
types of persons is that each has been stamped with a particular
label, or a social marker identifying an aspect of one's social
identity. In his book, The Ethics of Identity, Anthony Appiah
describes the structure of social identity by means of a three-part
theory of social labeling." 3 According to Appiah's model, the first
requirement for the construction of a collective social identity is
the existence of a "social conception" about a particular collective
of persons. 114 Such a social conception will only develop where
there are "terms in public discourse that are used to pick out the
bearers of the identity by way of criteria of ascription so that some
people are recognized as members of the group. ' ' 15 In other
words, the first requirement for the presence of a meaningful social
identity is a socially available and widely recognized social label
that has been or is in the process of being attached to some
collective of persons. The social label may come from within the
collective itself, as with certain religious or cultural groups, or it
113. Appiah, supra note 78, at 65-71.
114. Id. at 67.
115. Id. at 66-67.
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may develop around an external social consensus that the persons
who fall within a particular class are alike in certain ways, either in
terms of their appearance, their presumed behavior, or other
socially detectable tendencies. These notions regarding classes of
persons are, of course, stereotypes about the members of various
groups, and the stereotypes are often inaccurate and can be
tremendously injurious.
Further, in the same way that we
described the essential nature of social categories above as "fuzzy
sets," social labels need not apply in any determinate fashion to
any expressly defined set of persons to be meaningful. As Appiah
says:
For a social conception to exist, it is enough that there be a
rough overlap in the classes . . . so there need be no
precisely agreed boundaries, no determinate extension; nor
is it necessary that the stereotypes or16 criteria of ascription
be identical for all users of the term."
Hence, a social label may apply even where the social
conception of the persons to whom the label is applied varies
according to the bearers of the conception, perhaps in light of
differences in social status or simply different life experiences
leading to the development of different cognitive schema. For
instance, one's conception of being Mormon, gay, or AfricanAmerican may entail very different meanings for the bearers of
these labels than it would for persons outside these social
classifications.
There will also typically be a measure of
disagreement regarding the content of the social label even among
the bearers of any particular label. As a brief thought experiment,
imagine for a moment that you were asked to describe the artist
Marc Chagall. Assuming the name is familiar, perhaps a colorful,
somewhat surreal image of nineteenth or early twentieth century
Russian-Jewish village life would flood your mind, or you might
visualize some particularly vivid biblical or folkloric imagery. If
you were like me--that is, if you shared my cognitive
schema-probably you would begin by describing Chagall as one
of the most famous Jewish artists of the modem era. Each of these
four
descriptive
terms--famous,
Jewish,
artist,
and
modern--describes a type of person. Notice, though, that none has
anything approaching a determinate meaning. There will rarely be
uniformity regarding what it means to be famous, Jewish, an artist,
or modern, even among persons to whom we might regularly
attach these social labels.
But neither the indeterminacy
concerning the relative variation in the social conception of classes
116. Id. at 67.
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of persons nor their frequent derivation from inaccurate stereotypes
makes the social label itself any less potent or consequential. It
simply means, first, that just as the categories of persons within
society are best characterized as fuzzy, so too are the social labels
used to describe them, and second, that social labels frequently
function in an ascriptively inegalitarian fashion.
In conjunction with the development of a social conception
with respect to some class of persons and the application to that
class of a social label, "the second element of a social identity,"
according to Appiah's model, "is the internalization of those labels
as parts of the individual identities of at least some of those who
bear the label. '17 It is tempting to conceptualize Appiah's first
two elements sequentially, such that a social conception along with
a social label descriptive of the conception is developed first, and
then subsequently internalized by those to whom the label is
applied. This sequential conceptualization of the process of social
identity formation is likely largely faithful to the social
construction of racial identities, for example. The social salience
of a subordinated racial group probably does emanate, at least
initially, from outside the group to whom the social label is
attached, and only subsequently does the label and its (typically
stigmatic) content become internalized." 18 Yet, the internalization
of a social label need not follow in any precise way the
development of a social conception with respect to that label;
Appiah's elements, at least as I interpret them, need not be
sequential. Where the essence of a social label is derived
internally or constructed and then projected (intentionally or
unintentionally) from within the collective itself, the internalization
of a label ("we are X") may actually precede and may even
instigate the development of a social conception ("you are X")
regarding the collective. Again, the paradigmatic collective in the
United States is a religious group. It seems unlikely, for example,
that Amish practitioners' sense of their own social identity became
internalized only once a more general social consensus regarding
what it means to be Amish came to exist. Instead, the Amish
identity springs primarily from the religious and traditional values
that its members have come to affirm."l 9 Of course, the very
existence of the Amish as a religious group in the United States is
117. Id. at 68.
118. See, e.g., Amy Gutmann, IDENTITY INDEMOCRACY 117 (2003) (describing
race as an ascriptive status).
119. See, e.g., Donald B. Kraybill, Negotiating with Caesar, in THE AMISH
AND THE STATE 3, 7-15 (Donald B. Kraybill ed., 1993) (describing Amish
traditions).
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a result of broader social forces, particularly religious persecution
that led to wide-scale emigration from Europe in the mid-sixteenth
and early seventeenth centuries. 120
Further, once a social
conception regarding such a collective exists, its content, along
with the meaning signified by its social label, may evolve in a way
that leads also to an evolution in the substance of the identity
characteristics internalized by the labeled members. Hence, what
it means to be Amish within a broader heterogeneous society, even
for the members of an Old Order sect, is subject to adjustment or
even transformation as a result of changes in both internal
collective and external social conceptions. The broader process of
constructing social labels and the internalization of the content of
those labels most often proceeds interactively and in tandem, rather
than in a unilinear or sequential pattern.
As an individual to whom a social label has been attached
internalizes the label, it becomes for him a part of who he is, an
element of his identity that influences certain aspects of his social
life. Recalling the idea of the artist as a social category, an
individual so labeled may feel compelled, in light of his
internalization of the social label, to act in the world as an artist; to
support the arts, perhaps, or to attempt to be creative in other facets
of his life. Similarly, a farmer might, in light of social norms
associated with the label "farmer," consciously seek to avoid
appearing weak or lazy in public. Or perhaps she would come to
the aid of a fellow farmer suffering drought merely because he is in
need and he is a farmer. Firemen, especially after the events of
September 11, 2001, are often perceived as brave and heroic;
miners present a social image of struggle and loss; academics, an
image of intelligence but impracticality. And returning once again
to the Old Order Amish, the core of the religious group's value
structure is grounded in a sense of Gelassenheit, or
submissiveness. This value structure thus informs the Amish
identity in ways that make a difference to their daily lives: the
Amish are taught to be deferential, obedient, and content with
simplicity and self-denial. "The religious meaning of Gelassenheit
expresses itself in a quiet and reserved personality and places the
needs of others above the self. Gelassenheit nurtures a subdued
self--gentle handshakes, lower voices, slower strides-a life
etched with modesty and reserve.,"12 1 With the internalization of
social labels comes self-identification as labeled, and this selfidentification helps to shape one's place in the world, and, in the
process, even partially to define one's self.
120. Id.at 6.
121. Id. at 12-13.
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"The final element of a social identity," Appiah suggests, "is
the existence of patterns of behavior toward Ls [where L stands ''for
2
labeled persons], such that Ls are sometimes treated as Ls. 1 2
This seems essentially the mirror opposite of Appiah's second
identification-as element. Whereas the internalization of a social
label reflects one's self-identification as labeled, the treatment-as
element focuses upon the external social response to, and
reinforcement of, that label. As above, the relationship between
this and the other elements in Appiah's model is best
conceptualized as interactive and multi-linear rather than as
sequential. Certainly, the third element may help facilitate the
clearly
may
promote
the
second-treatment-as-labeled
internalization of a social label. The third element might also
influence the content of the first element since treatment-as-labeled
may stimulate movement in the underlying social conception itself,
in either oppressive or progressive directions. For example, the
notion of treatment-as-labeled likely brings almost immediately to
mind discriminatory social practices associated with an
individual's race, gender, sexual orientation, nationality, etc.
Hence, the discriminatory treatment of a Muslim, specifically in
light of her religious affiliation, might lead the person treated-aslabeled (element 3) further to internalize the Muslim aspect of her
social identity (element 2). This sort of treatment-as-labeled
(element 3) may also cause a transformation in the broader social
conception of Muslims (element 1). This might happen, first, in a
malevolent sense by signaling one segment of the population's
sense of how Muslims should be treated. But then, second, it
might also cause a change in the underlying social conception of
Muslims in a more benevolent sense by shedding light on
oppressive practices. Certain images broadcast of the treatment of
civil rights protestors in the southern United States in the 1950s
and 1960s seemed to have similar effects.
One way to conceptualize the core methodological idea of the
sort of labeling theory explored here--the idea that the creation of
a social label occurs simultaneously with the social invention of
types of persons-is in terms of the approach that Ian Hacking has
nominalism."' 123
In
admittedly
designated
"dynamic
oversimplified terms, a nominalist would view our generalizing
about various categories of objects and persons as entirely the
result of human social thought; for example, the only true
Appiah, supra note 78, at 68.
See Ian Hacking, Making Up People, in FORMS OF DESIRE: SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST CONTROVERSY 78 (Edward
Stein ed., 1992).
122.
123.
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commonality among the objects in our category "trees," according
to a thorough-going nominalism, is the fact that we have come
collectively to describe all such objects as "trees." In contrast, a
realist would point out that all of the objects that fall within our
category of trees do, in fact, emerge from a seed; realism views
general categories as having an actual existence or as being
grounded in reality.
Hacking, in describing a "dynamic
nominalism," seeks to provide an alternative both to conventional
nominalism, to the extent that it envisions fixed or static
categories, and to traditional realism. "The claim of dynamic
nominalism," Hacking writes, "is not that there was a kind of
person who came increasingly to be recognized by bureaucrats or
by students of human nature but rather that a kind of person came
into being at the same time as the kind itself was being
invented. ' T24 As an example of the way in which social categories
or "kinds of persons" are constructed through a process of dynamic
nominalism, Hacking points in particular to the idea that there is a
social category of gay persons, or a homosexual type. Samegender sexual activity, we know, has existed throughout recorded
human history, but most commentators within gay and lesbian
studies agree that homosexuality as a social category, as a type of
person, developed only once individuals engaged in same-gender
sexual behavior began to be labeled as such within the last century
or so. 12 5 Clearly, the invention of the social label was, in part, a
response to social forces, including extreme prejudice, and to the
real existence of differences in social or sexual interaction;
nevertheless, the invention of the social label and2 6category also
simultaneously created a new way for people to be.'
In this respect, consider again the social category in the United
States composed of Native Americans as well as the derivation of
the social label "American Indians." As Joane Nagel explains it:
At the time of the earliest European contact with North
America, there were no American Indians. The aboriginal
inhabitants of North America encountered by European
travelers spoke myriad languages; possessed a wide variety
of cultures; displayed a broad diversity of social, economic,
and political organization; and had no conception
of
27
themselves as a single "race," group or people. 1
124. Id.
125. See especially the essays collected in THE MAKING OF THE MODERN
HOMOsExuAL (Kenneth Plummer ed., 1981).
126. Hacking, supra note 123, at 70 (emphasis added).
127. Nagel, supra note 7, at 3.
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The Native American "type" of person arose as a result of a
broad, continental population convergence and the social,
including legal, classifications that resulted from those encounters.
In fact, as most schoolchildren learn, the social label "American
Indian" reveals more about the European explorers' true original
objective (i.e., to locate a trade route to the East Indies) than it does
about the ethnically diverse population to whom the label became
attached.12 8 Perhaps, had the European settlers perceived some
incentive in differentiating among the hundreds of culturally,
linguistically, politically, and geographically diverse tribes they
encountered, the more general social classification would have
been less prominent and less constitutive of tribe members' social
identities. However, from the settlers' perspective, and perhaps
also from that of the indigenous inhabitants, the vast bulk of the
social, economic, and military interaction between the populations
was viewed through the single dimension of land and resource
allocation. 129 Hence, consistent with Hacking's view of dynamic
nominalism, the creation of the social category and cultural label
and the emergence of a collective identity appears to have occurred
simultaneously. Ever since, being Native American, either as a
result of self-identification or as a consequence of external social
ascription, or both, simply has become one of the many ways for
persons to be in North America.
We have, then, a basic model of the processes by which social
identity is constituted and a sense of the interactive complexity of
those processes. As Appiah says: "Where a classification of
people as Ls [where, again, L stands for labeled persons] is
associated with a social conception of Ls, some people identify as
Ls, and people are sometimes treatedas Ls, we have a paradigm of
a social identity that matters for ethical and political life."' 130 And
it matters greatly because an individual's social identity resonates
both in one's self-perception and during critical moments of social
and political interaction. Yet, what role does law play in the
constitution of social identities such as those we have encountered?
I propose that law be viewed as one of many agents of
socialization, or as a particular social medium through which ideas,
including ideas about persons' social identities, can be constructed
and spread throughout society. Although neglected, this idea is not
a new one. Indeed, in his commentary on social life and politics in
nineteenth century America, de Tocqueville may have been the
first modem theorist to appreciate the socializing influence of law:
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
Appiah, supra note 78, at 69.
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So legal language is pretty well adopted into common
speech; the spirit of the law, born in schools and courts,
spreads little by little beyond them; it infiltrates through
society right down to the lowest ranks, till finally the whole
people have contracted some of the ways and tastes of a
magistrate.
In the United States the lawyers constitute a power which
is little dreaded and hardly noticed; it has no banner of its
own; it adapts itself flexibly to the exigencies of the
moment and lets itself be carried along unresistingly by
every movement of the body social; but it enwraps the
whole of society, penetrating each component class and
constantly working in secret upon its unconscious
patient,
13
till in the end it has molded it to his desire. '
In this regard, recall what we have said of the social
construction of the Native American as a type of person.
American Indian ethnicity, as we have seen, arises as a general
social category out of numerous, unique indigenous cultures, and
the U.S. government has entered into hundreds of treaties with
distinct sovereign Indian nations.
Despite this marked
heterogeneity, legal institutions have viewed the different tribes
and tribe members as similarly situated for purposes of a
considerable number of their legal interests and obligations. This
is neither surprising nor necessarily disadvantageous. It is simply
the nature of law consistent with formal justice. The law is
general, and, as a consequence, persons are categorized according
to characteristics deemed relevant by legal decision-makers. With
respect to this particular legal category, it is the Native American
status itself that has been deemed relevant.
Legislative
universalizability has been expressed in this area through a general
body of federal Indian law, including that which comprises a
special volume of the U.S. Code.' 3
Adjudicative decisions
regarding tribes and tribe members persist as legal rules applicable
to subsequent litigants and they do so specifically in light of the
litigants' particular status as Native Americans. Tribes fall within
the regulatory purview of a distinct administrative agency, the
Bureau of Indian Affairs. And Native Americans are treated as
one undifferentiated classification for constitutional purposes as
well.' 33

131.
132.
133.

de Tocqueville, supra note 68, at 270.
See Nagel, supra note 7, at 8.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (taxation).
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It should, then, not be at all surprising that "American Indian"
or "Native American" has come to be viewed as a way to be or as a
distinct type of person in American society in ways that matter
socially and politically. Why have so many of us come to believe
that one's being Native American is an important aspect of the
various tribe members' social identities? As Joane Nagel has
indicated:
If informal ethnic categories and meanings can shape the
everyday experiences of minority groups, formal or official
ethnic labels are all the more powerful sources of identity
and social experience because they carry the imprimatur of
the state. When mandatory ethnicity is official,
the power
34
of the ethnic ascription is vastly reinforced. 1
The Native American social label and its corresponding collective
identity has come so forcefully into view because the law
categorizes indigenous cultures in this fashion, labels the collective
"Indians," and indicates to every one of us that this is a salient
distinction-a distinction that will matter legally, politically, and
socially.
Indeed, the same might be said of any legal rule, the investitive
criteria of which reflect differentiated, and socially salient,
characteristics.
Thus, disability and citizenship laws further
constitute categories of persons, influencing the social identity and
status of the individuals such laws describe. These legal rules
reflect socially salient differences among persons, differences
grounded in physicality and power relations, and, perhaps,
differences that find their source in deep cultural and historical
forces. Legal institutions, in this way, further construct applicable
social labels, marking the disabled from the able-bodied, and the
citizen from the resident or undocumented alien, and in the process
they spread and further constitute social conceptions of the
individuals such laws describe. So too do laws denying the
institution of marriage to same-sex couples, as do such laws'
pragmatic, though morally unsatisfactory, surrogates, which
announce the constitution of a new and distinct form of social
relationship, the civil union or domestic partnership.'3 5 These
legal institutions function as agents of socialization, turning as they
do on socially salient criteria, further constructing social labels,
and thereby entrenching and constituting social perceptions,
statuses, and identities.
134. Nagel, supra note 7, at 27-28.
135. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND
THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS 234-35 (2002).
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Though there is almost always a moral undercurrent to laws
that differentiate among classes of persons on the basis of socially
salient traits, the conception of law as an agent of socialization is
not offered here from any one normative perspective. While the
exclusion of classes of persons on the basis of inegalitarian
ascriptive statuses might indeed be morally unjustified, the bare
notion that law functions in a socializing mode is a descriptive
claim. Indeed, although historically legal differentiation could
typically be associated with an illiberal agenda in the form of
unequal treatment and potentially severe constraints on individual
autonomy, there is no necessary connection between such
differentiation and the violation of liberal democratic principles.
For instance, cultural rights differentiate among persons on the
basis of socially salient characteristics and so serve also to
entrench, spread, and enable the further construction of social
labels, statuses and identities. And yet this legal differentiation,
although the subject of continuing controversy even with
136
liberalism, frequently has been justified on liberal grounds.
Similarly, legally instituted programs of affirmative action serve as
agents of socialization since they turn on socially salient
differences, and yet many would argue that such37socialization runs
in a justifiably liberal and progressive direction.'
Hence, at least for present purposes, the commonality among
these several seemingly disparate examples is not one to be found
in moral argumentation. Instead, each represents an instance of
legal investitive criteria reflecting differentiated and socially
salient characteristics. As we have seen, such characteristics
described by law, which become socially salient in virtue of
physical and deep cultural differences, power relations among
categories of persons, and broader historical forces, serve further to
construct social labels, thereby enabling law's role as an agent of
socialization. Oddly, most sociologists and social psychologists
who study the social construction of identity largely have failed to
take note of law's constitutive influence. Admittedly, there are
numerous other social institutions that serve as agents of
136. See, e.g., Joseph H. Carens, CULTURE, CITIZENSHIP, AND COMMUNITY:
A CONTEXTUAL EXPLORATION OF JUSTICE AS EVENHANDEDNESS (2000); Will
Kymlicka, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY
RIGHTS (1995) (arguing that minority cultural rights serve freedom and
equality). But see Brian Barry, CULTURE AND EQUALITY: AN EGALITARIAN
CRITIQUE OF MULTICULTURALISM (2001) (arguing that multicultural programs
violate liberal principles).
137. See, e.g., Appiah & Gutmann, supra note 87, at 131; Michel Rosenfeld,
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND JUSTICE: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL

INQUIRY 284-96 (1991).
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socialization in a more immediate and powerful sense than do laws
and legal institutions. Sociologists and social psychologists have
focused primarily on the role of schools, the family, the media and
popular culture, corporations and the market, and cultural,
religious, and peer groups in the social construction, delineation,
and dissemination of social identity. They have done so, however,
without
justification and almost to the complete exclusion of
38
law.'
To be fair, though, the neglect has been mutual. Legal scholars
interested in identity construction have been at least as inattentive
to broader social institutions as sociologists and social
psychologists have been to law. The growing literature on
constitutive theory within the legal academy almost entirely
neglects law's osition among social institutions constitutive of
human identity." 39 If pressed, however, it is doubtful that any
serious legal commentator could believe that the law is as
influential a socializing agent as the educational system, the mass
media, or the family. Schools regularly evaluate children in
comparison to their peers, categorizing individual students
according to academic, athletic, and other performance measures in
ways that deeply influence the students' self-perceptions and social
identities. As one study found, when "students perceive that
teachers have labeled them as 'underachievers' or 'slow learners,'
they may be more likely to behave in ways that corroborate that
perception; by contrast, students labeled 'gifted' or 'intelligent'
may more readily embrace academic performance as an activity
boosting their self-concepts., 140 And the educational system
socializes in a vast array of non-performance based directions as
well; for instance, by teaching children, in ways both explicit and
implicit (and for better or worse) that gender, nationality, ethnicity,
and other collective identities are salient social differences.
Likewise, the proliferation and successful penetration in
contemporary society of mass media and advertising has proven an
effective instrument of socialization. Adolescent self-conceptions
in particular are swayed, and to some extent intentionally
manipulated, through newspaper and magazine images and

138. See, e.g., Allport, supranote 34, at 211-12; Cerulo, supra note 71, at 387.
139. See, e.g., Paul W. Kahn, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW:
RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (1999).

140. Karen Lutfey & Jeylan T. Mortimer, Development and Socialization
Through the Adult Life Course, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 187
(John Delamater ed., 2003) (citing Robert Rosenthal & Lenore Jacobson,
PYGMALION IN THE CLASSROOM (1968)).
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articles, television shows, movies, and music. 14 1 Indeed, according
to one researcher, individual adolescents serve as the audience for
mass media an average of nearly seven hours a day. 142 Even if this
finding exaggerates the real degree of adolescent attention to
media, clearly a significantly lesser extent still permits for fashion
magazines to shape especially girls' self-images, sneaker
advertisements to provide points of identity reference especially
for boys, and popular music to construct entire youth subcultures. 143 And, even beyond the socializing effects of schools
and the media, perhaps no social institution is as effectively
constitutive of human identity as the most basic social unit, the
family. Parents and other relatives intensely influence childhood
development in ways that extend well into adolescence and
adulthood. 144 Our families determine, at least at the outset, our
nationalities, religious and other cultural affiliations (or our lack
thereof), social class, and even our life prospects and fundamental
world-views. Though we may seek to distance ourselves from our
native backgrounds in ways large and small, there is abundant
evidence that social and cultural connections derived from familial
sources remain persistent. As Michael Walzer
has written,
145
"identities are, mostly, the gifts of... parents."'
Hence, in comparison with other social institutions, law will
generally play a secondary role in the socialization of persons and
the construction of social identity. Even as an admittedly lesser
partner in the social constructionist project, however, legal
institutions remain constitutive of human identity in ways that
matter greatly. Law inherently categorizes persons in the service
of fairness, predictability, and freedom, and perhaps, on a deeper
level, as a result of the fundamental processes of human social
cognition.
At a minimum, then, law functions in an
institutionalizing and disseminating capacity, providing a
mechanism for the entrenchment and further reinforcement of
141. Donna Eder & Sandi Kawecka Nenga, Socialization in Adolescence, in
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 173-74 (John Delamater ed., 2003).
142. See Donna Gaines, TEENAGE WASTELAND: SUBURBIA'S DEAD END
KIDS (1991); Eder & Nenga, supra note 141, at 173 (citing Donald F. Roberts,
Media and Youth: Access, Exposure, and Privatization, 27 J. ADOLESCENT
HEALTH 8 (2000)).
143. See Eder & Nenga, supra note 141, at 173-74; Melissa A. Milkie,
Social Comparisons, Reflected Appraisals, and Mass Media: The Impact of
Pervasive Beauty Images on Black and White Girls' Self-Concepts, 62 SOC.
PSYCHOL. Q. 190 (1999); Brian Wilson & Robert Sparks, "It's Gotta Be the
Shoes": Youth, Race, and Sneaker Commercials, 13 SOC'Y SPORT J. 398 (1996).
144. See Lutfey & Mortimer, supra note 140, at 186-88.
145. Michael Walzer, On Involuntary Association, in FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION 64, 65 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998).
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social identity differentiation emanating from social institutions
other than law. Yet, law's constitutive influence is not limited to
so passive a role. Social categories, including those categories
constituted by legal institutions, are best conceptualized as fuzzy
sets in light of their peripheral criteria and necessarily indistinct
borders. This fuzziness, reflected also in the indeterminacy
apparent in legal investitive criteria, creates additional room for the
legal construction of social categories. In this way, law functions
also in an interpretive and transformative capacity. Whenever a
social category is to be institutionalized in law, it necessarily
becomes subject to interpretation by legal institutions, both at the
point of legislative entrenchment and, even more plainly, in the
context of adjudication and administrative implementation.
Law, thus, provides more than an expedient means for the
entrenchment and reinforcement of pre-existing social conceptions
and social labels regarding the classes of persons sorted by legal
institutions. It also serves, in its own right, as a source of further
development of those conceptions and labels. Law and legal
institutions constitute aspects of human social identity when the
investitive criteria that serve as the bases for legal categorization
reflect socially salient characteristics. The social salience of
legally investitive criteria is a complex social cognitive
phenomenon, grounded in a combination of physicality, power
relationships, cultural differences, and deep history.
Legal
institutions reinforce the social salience of the human
characteristics described by law and, in the process, further
construct social labels attached to categories of persons. Members
of the society at large, consciously or unconsciously, take notice of
the social conceptions and labels propagated through the law, and
individual members of the categories reflected and further
constituted by legal institutions internalize their differentiated
status. In this way, law serves as one of many institutional agents
of socialization.
The path to understanding law's relationship with social
identity is not constrained to the garden of sociolegal studies. That
path has many branches and is far from being fully mapped. In the
context of constitutive theory, this article has shown, sociolegal
scholars have much to gain from encounters with cultural
sociology and social and cognitive psychology. Law is indeed
partially constitutive of who and what we are. But if we are ever
truly to understand how and why legal institutions constitute us as
they do, we must not permit the boundaries of our respective
disciplines to limit the range of our thinking.

